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1. Introduction 
 
The use of explicit incentives to improve the efficiency of the public sector is an 
important component of the UK Government’s public service modernisation agenda. 
Explicit incentive contracts in the form of performance-related pay have always been 
more common in the private sector than in the public sector
1, but the issue of 
incentivising the public sector is relatively recent. In November 1998, the Public 
Services Productivity Panel was created to “bring in outside experts … to advise the 
Government on ways of improving the productivity and efficiency of government 
departments”
2.  A long term commitment in this direction was announced in the 
White Paper "Modernising Government", issued in March 1999, which emphasised 
the role of financial and other incentives to promote better performance. New 
performance indicators and systems of measuring and monitoring performance have 
been adopted. Particular emphasis has been laid on performance-based incentives, as 
a means to better motivate staff, and hence improve services to the public.  
In this paper we review the important issues in performance pay in the public sector, 
and summarise the evidence on its effects. We investigate the reasons for the 
infrequent use of explicit incentives in the public sector. On the one hand, recent 
developments in incentive theory suggest that incentives in the public sector may 
optimally be absent or very low-powered. According to this view optimal incentives 
for public sector workers differ from those in the private sector. An alternative view is 
that the relative weakness of incentive schemes in the public sector is due to strong 
union opposition and weak government. This seems to be the view point of some of 
the public and policy debate on incentivising the public sector, which is based on the 
premise that one can simply read across from the private sector.  
In section 2 we briefly review general issues in incentive design
3. In section 3 we 
consider how optimal incentives for public sector workers may differ from those in 
the private sector, and if so, what types of incentives are more appropriate for the 
                                                 
1 See Burgess and Metcalfe (1999a) for some data. 
2 Source: http://www.hm -
Treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_spending_and_services/public_services_productivity_panel/pss_ps
p_backgrd.cfm  
3 Other recent surveys of related material include Prendergast (1999) on incentives in firms, 
Malcolmson (1999) on incentive contracts, Murphy (1999) on executive pay, Gibbons (1998) on 
incentives in organisations, Lazear (1999) on personnel economics, and Chiappori and Salanie (2003) 
on evidence on contracts.  The most useful companion to this paper is Dixit’s (2002) on public sector 
issues; he focusses on theoretical aspects (which we downplay here) and we highlight evidence.   2
public sector. Following Prendergast (1999) , we note the scarcity of evidence relative 
to theory, but summarise some of particular relevance to the public sector in section 4. 
In section 5 we briefly describe some of the new policies being introduced in the UK 
public sector. We comment on the design of the incentive schemes in the light of the 
theoretical arguments and the evidence provided in the earlier sections. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. General Issues in Designing Optimal Incentives  
 
The core model used to analyse the design of incentives is the principal-agent model, 
and in particular the moral hazard (hidden action) model. The effort undertaken by the 
agent is not observable by the principal (the private firm or public organisation). We 
briefly discuss the standard case and then consider some refinements. 
 
(a) The standard Principal Agent case  
 
In the standard models of moral hazard, incentives to exert the appropriate level of 
effort are delivered by linking the agent's compensation to his performance. Typically 
the reward schemes analysed in the theoretical models are linear functions of 
performance. When output is perfectly observable, as in the case of a monetary 
outcome, the value of output provides a perfect indicator of the agent’s effort, hence 
paying an individual the full value of his output will induce the Pareto optimal level 
of effort. When output also depends on some random component, the principal is not 
able to infer the worker’s effort precisely. If the agent is risk averse, the optimal 
scheme involves less sharp incentives. The reward system consists of a constant term 
- a risk premium - to compensate the agent for the risk intrinsic in the production 
process and a marginal reward proportional to the output produced, which measures 
the sharpness or intensity of the incentive scheme. The simple case shows that the 
incentives are less sharp (in this sense) the more noisy is the output measure, the 
higher is the agent’s risk aversion, and the higher is the marginal cost of effort. This 
result encapsulates the classic trade-off between risk and incentives
4. It also highlights 
                                                 
4 Though see Gibbons (1998) and Prendergast (2002) who argue that this is now much less central to 
the study of the characteristics of pay-performance schedules in firms.   3
the key importance of measurement – poor measures of performance lead optimally to 
low-powered incentive structures. 
Holmström and Milgrom (1987) show that while linear schemes are optimal under 
some specific circumstances, they are often also used in both the theoretical models 
and in practice for their simplicity and their applicability. Another type of reward 
schemes commonly considered in the theoretical models makes the compensation of 
the agent conditional on achieving a certain threshold of performance (step functions). 
Holmström (1979) and Mirrlees (1999) analyse the circumstances where these 
schemes can approximate the first best. Intuitively, these schemes are optimal when 
the output is very sensitive to the agent’s effort in the neighbourhood of the threshold, 
so that if the agent slackens his effort even marginally, he faces a drastic penalty. As 
pointed out by Dixit (2002) step functions may be preferred by politicians to linear 
contracts. Politicians, in fact, are usually very risk averse, as they cannot easily 
diversify the risk of bad outcomes of public policies and agencies. Schemes which set 
a minimum standard of performance and a bonus for more are therefore attractive. 
The main  disadvantage of such incentive schemes is that they are vulnerable to 
manipulation by the agents, as we show below.  
 
(b) Multiple tasks, Measurement and Incentives 
 
The simple structure above is likely to be inappropriate in many, probably the 
majority of, cases. Agents perform different tasks in their jobs, and Holmström and 
Milgrom (1990, 1991) provide an analysis of how this multi-tasking affects the 
optimal design of an incentive scheme. A general insight is that interaction among the 
different tasks affects the power of the incentive scheme: if actions are substitutes the 
use of high powered incentive schemes may have undesirable effects on overall 
performance. This is because exerting more effort on one task increases the marginal 
cost of the task which is a substitute. Higher marginal incentives in one task will drive 
the agent’s effort away from the tasks which are substitutes.  
It is also likely t hat tasks contributing to multiple outcomes are measured with 
different errors. If each outcome could be rewarded in isolation, then the optimal 
incentive scheme would set higher incentives on the more easily measurable 
outcomes - as they provide a more accurate indicator of the effort exerted by the 
agent. However, in a context where there are multiple dimensions of output, this   4
would make the agent concentrate on the tasks which are more accurately measured. 
To avoid this misallocation of effort by the agent, the principal has to weaken the 
incentives on the more accurately measured tasks. 
An interesting case is analysed by Marx and MacDonald (2001). They consider 
activities which are substitutes from the perspective of the agents (more time spent on 
one activity means less time on others), but complements from the perspective of the 
principal (the principal wants high performance in all of them). Therefore the agent is 
willing to devote more time to the less difficult activities, whereas the principal 
prefers him to devote time to all activities. They show that, if the principal is unsure 
about the agent’s preferences over tasks, setting rewards on success on individual 
tasks may be sub-optimal in that it may induce workers to focus and specialise in the 
less costly tasks. The system of reward is typically non-monotonic, in that it defines 
different rewards according to the observed failure, partial success or full success on 
all tasks. Little specific compensation is awarded for each task. 
 
(c) Intertemporal Aspects 
 
Most principal-agent relationships extend over a period of time, during which the 
agent takes actions several times and the principal observes output several times. This 
may induce the agent to manipulate the incentive scheme, and can give rise to the so 
called ratchet effect. By observing what outcomes the agent obtains in early periods, 
the principal can try to infer the difficulty of the task. If the agent does well in early 
periods, the principal will believe that the task is relatively easy and she will therefore 
decrease the incentive wage. An agent who is aware of this will respond by under-
performing early on in order to make the principal think that the task is relatively 
difficult. Ratchet effects arise when the principal cannot commit to an incentive 
system that will not change as results become available. Gibbons (1987) and Laffont 
and Tirole (1988, 1993, Chapter 9) provide a valuable discussion and analysis of the 
ratchet effect in multi-period settings. 
The other side of the coin is that if the principal is unsure, a priori, about the agent's 
ability. When the measured outcome of an agent depends on the agent's effort, some 
exogenous noise and also the agent's ability, repeated interactions make it possible for 
the principal to learn about the ability of the worker. In these cases the principal may 
not need to use explicit incentives to induce the appropriate level of effort by the   5
agent, but can exploit some implicit incentives not specified in explicit contracts, but 
relying more on the intrinsic motivation of the agent.  
One example is career concerns. By exerting higher effort in the early stages, the 
agent can influence the principal's perceptions about his talent, in order to get higher 
future wages or better jobs opportunities: higher performance in the early stages will 
enhance the perception of the principal and will translate in better prospects of future 
rewards or job opportunities. The principal does not need to set explicit incentives to 
motivate the worker to work hard: the worker will exert high effort even if paid a 
fixed contract in order to influence the principal's perceptions. An interesting insight, 
as emphasised by Dixit (2002), is that the issue of career concerns can reverse a 
presumption of the moral hazard problems that greater uncertainty means weaker 
incentives. Greater uncertainty about abilities leads to greater uncertainty about the 
outcome for the principal. However, since effort in a career concern model is driven 
by talent uncertainty, greater uncertainty will induce the agent to exert greater effort 
in order to impress the principal about his talent. The principal can offer sharper 
incentives because this elicits larger effort from the young in the attempt to prove 
their ability. This argument is developed by  Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999), 
who extend Holmström’s (1982) seminal model on career concerns to a multi-tasks 
context. 
 




In this section we investigate why optimal incentive structures in the public sector 
may differ from those in the private sector.  Theory suggests some arguments against 
the use of high-powered incentive schemes, relating to specific aspects of how 
organisations are structured and on how output is produced and measured. In this 
section we review a number of such arguments: multiple principals, extreme 
measurement problems, intrinsic motivation, and the importance of teams in 
production. Although some of these features can also be found in large firms in the 
private sector, they are typical of public sector organisations.  
 
   6
(a) Multiple principals 
 
It is argued that one key feature of the public sector is that agents have to serve many 
masters; technically, that they work for many principals. Delivering incentives in 
these circumstances is more complex, in that principals are usually interested only in 
some dimensions of outputs and those interests are not aligned. Berheim and 
Whinston (1986) provide the seminal model on moral hazard problems in multi-
principal settings. Further developments include Holmström and Milgrom (1988), 
who derive the optimal linear contract in a context with two principals, and Dixit 
(1996, 1997) who extends their analysis to a multi-principals setting. The main insight 
is that in these settings each principal will offer a positive coefficient on the 
element(s) she is interested in and negative coefficients on the other dimensions. This 
creates a negative externality on the other principals who have to face lower efforts in 
those dimensions. The aggregate marginal incentive coefficient for each outcome is 
decreasing in the number of principals. When the agent’s efforts for the different 
principals are substitutes the agent will be more willing to allocate his effort for those 
principals who pay higher coefficients and this will reinforce the effect of the negative 
externality and hence will further weaken the aggregate marginal incentives. Dixit 
(1997) shows that the negative externality created by the interaction among the 
different principals may be internalised by separating the information regarding each 
outcome, so that each principal observe and reward only his own outcome,  or by 
grouping together those principals whose interests are aligned. Which solution is more 
appropriate depends on a specific context. As noted by Dixit (2002), in some political 
context like the legislature or the executive, it may be impractical to restrain the 
actions of the principal from outside.  
 
(b) Measurement and Monitoring 
 
Output measurement problems are very common in both the private and public 
sectors. Of course, there are many jobs that occur in both sectors (for example, 
secretaries, electricians, designers, purchasing managers etc.), and the measurement 
issues will also then be more-or-less common. But there are a number of occupations, 
which do divide strongly between public and private sectors – there are not many 
sales personnel in the public sector, and not many police officers (for example) in the   7
private. The key point is that for those uniquely in  the public sector, there are two 
interlocking features. First, they are decision-makers – for example, welfare benefits 
assessors, police officers, tax inspectors, agency managers. Second, the organisations 
they work for do not have a single, clear goal. At its most basic, they are typically 
meant to achieve efficiency and some measure of equity. There are of course workers 
doing the same types of jobs (in terms of the same daily tasks) in the private sector – 
insurance claim assessors, security firms, tax advisors, managers – but they have a 
much clearer decision framework, value maximisation. This combination makes these 
individuals difficult to incentivise and difficult to monitor. 
If measuring outcomes is difficult, monitoring performance becomes important, and it 
seems likely that there might be different methods of monitoring depending on the 
type of organisation. Prendergast (2002) examines the problem of inducing efficient 
performance from bureaucrats in a case where the problem is most acute: types of 
public organisations defined by Wilson (1989) as “ coping organisations”. 
Bureaucrats are characterised as having control over the transfer of an asset to a 
customer. In particular, their decision depends on factors which are not easily 
observable by the superiors. Police officers are a good example of such bureaucracies: 
the decision over arresting a suspect is based on the suspicion of guilt that the police 
officer has, which is not observable by his superiors. Unlike in non-bureaucratic 
settings, the decision to transfer the good cannot be based on a price paid by the 
customer, which is easily observable. Promoting efficiency in bureaucratic settings is 
therefore more difficult, above all when there are no easily available measures of 
performance, as is the case in coping organisations. In these organisations neither 
effort nor output is observable and  the primary way of controlling behaviour is by 
costly audits of the details of cases handled by individuals.  
These investigations are targeted to cases where a mistake is likely to have been made 
and are typically triggered by particular signals of a mistake, as consumer complaints. 
Prendergast shows that complaint mechanisms work less well in bureaucratic settings 
than elsewhere. But the optimal response  to this produces an outcome, widely 
observed, where standards of consumer service are low, bureaucracies are largely 
unresponsive to customer complaints, are predisposed to turning down consumers 
requests and  rarely have their decisions overturned.    8
Monitoring can be problematic even in situations where the outcomes are potentially 
observable even at individual level, but measuring performance requires sophisticated 
management information systems, which are too expensive for a public organisation.  
One practical result is that performance data is often only available at a more 
aggregate level than that at which production takes place. For example, outcomes are 
produced by individuals, but measured only at office level. In these cases only 
aggregate measure of performance are available, and a solution to the agency problem 
could be the use of team-rewards rather than individual rewards. This emphasis on the 
importance of monitoring and aggregated data suggests that a focus on teams may be 
particularly relevant to the public sector. 
 
(c) Teams in production and rewards 
 
The opposite case to a multi-principal situation is a context where there is one 
principal dealing with several agents, who contribute to the same final output and 
work in a team.  Holmström (1982) provides the seminal contribution to the theory of 
incentives in teams and shows that, in a setting where team members depend on each 
other to produce final output, i.e. where there are complementarities in production, if 
all the output of the team is shared among team members, team members are induced 
to free ride. This free-rider problem becomes greater in large organisations. The 
optimal compensation depends on how easy output is to measure, and on the size of 
the team. The greater the uncertainty in output measurement and the greater the size 
of the team the more complex is the design of an optimal incentive scheme and some 
form of monitoring may become necessary.  
The free-rider problem is the standard economics view of the likely (lack of) success 
of team-based rewards. And yet we see many examples of team incentives chosen by 
firms and public organisations. There must presumably be benefits to the structure. 
One key feature of team rewards is that they may induce peer monitoring. Linking the 
agents’ compensation to group performance may induce team members to monitor 
each other and hence reduce the extent of free-riding. Kandel and Lazear (1992) 
analyse the interaction between peer monitoring and effort and show that more effort 
can be induced by peer m onitoring when detection becomes more accurate as 
monitoring increases and the effect of being caught is substantial. This has an   9
important implication for the size of the team, in that in large teams the ability of 
workers to monitor or even inform on each other is reduced. 
In Holmström’s analysis the team is defined by the production function, in that team 
members are those agents whose effort contribute to the same outcome. However 
team-based rewards can also be used in context where there does not exist a “natural” 
production function to define the team. Team-based rewards may in themselves 
promote some positive externalities of teamwork. In some cases team-based rewards 
can be used to foster co-operation among team members. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) suggest that if co-operation within a group of individuals is important for the 
overall organisational objectives, than rewarding individual performance can detract 
from team performance by raising the marginal cost of effort in co-operating. The 
extent to w hich co-operation can be induced by group incentives depends on the 
strategic interaction between agents and their attitudes towards performing multiple 
tasks. Itoh (1991) analyses the relationship between financial incentives and ‘helping’ 
effort. He addresses the issue of whether it is always the case that, in moving from an 
individual based contract (i.e. one where individuals are paid only for their own 
output) towards one where rewards are based on teamwork, agents are induced to 
increase the level of helping effort. 
In a context where an agent can choose how much effort to devote to his own task and 
how much to help another agent, Itoh finds that whether co-operation can be induced 
through financial rewards depends on the strategic interactions among agents and 
their attitudes towards performing multiple tasks. In particular, agents can be induced 
to provide help, even for a small change in the wage schedule, if they get positive 
benefit from both types of effort. If, instead, tasks are similar and agents only care 
about the total amount of effort, they are reluctant to provide even a small amount of 
help. In this case a large perturbation of the individual-based contract is required to 
induce any helping effort from the individual. Co-operation may also be 
spontaneously induced by long-term repeated interactions among team members. Che 
and Yoo (2001) explain co-operation as a self-enforcing behaviour, in a context where 
team members interact repeatedly and show that task assignment and work 
organisation  together with group compensation can create implicit incentives which 
induce team members to co-operate. In particular, repeated interactions and mutual 
dependence  provide team members with the motivation and means to exert peer 
sanctions and enforce co-operation.   10
 
Teamwork may also facilitate a process of communication and sharing of job 
experience. There is evidence that this is particularly important for organisations like 
the UK National Health Service. Wilcok and Headrick (2000), Freeman et al (2000) 
provide evidence on the role of multi-professional teamwork and shared learning in 
improving health care provision.  
 
(d) Intrinsic Motivation 
 
Given the nature of the output in the public sector (and parts of the private sector), 
managers and workers may care about the amount produced, and therefore be less 
inclined to shirk. For example they may care about the sick, the old, or the 
unemployed. If the welfare of the clients is the sole goal of the organisation itself, 
workers will internalise the objectives of the organisation. Setting financial rewards 
based on performance may actually be counterproductive in that it may send the 
signal that the relationship between the workers and the organisation is a pure market 
relationship. As pointed out by Kreps (1997), this can dilute the workers’ intrinsic 
motivation and workers can develop a “distaste for the required effort”. On the other 
hand, it may be that the welfare of the clients is only one goal of the organisation, and 
in this case the workers’ intrinsic motivation will mean a misallocation of effort.  
There is an important interaction between intrinsic motivation and another 
characteristic of public sector agencies, namely the absence of a residual claimant.  
Francois (2000) develops this argument and shows that if workers care about the level 
of service provided by their organisation, this can motivate their own effort with no 
need for high powered incentives, provided there is no residual claimant. The insight 
is that when a worker cares about the outcome of his organisation, he can be 
motivated not to shirk only if he believes that the level of service will fall if he does 
not provide the effort. This can happen only when the employer can credibly commit 
not to make up any shirking by adjusting other inputs. In private firms this is not 
possible because the owner of the firm is the residual claimant of net profits and she 
cannot credibly commit not to make up any shirking, as this will mean lower profits 
for her.  
Only when there is no residual claimant can the employer credibly commit not to 
adjust other inputs and then the worker will not shirk since he knows that shirking   11
will affect output.  In these situations, the principal can incentivise workers at a lower 
cost, as she can pay a lower incentive compatible wage. Hence in public 
organisations, where there is no owner or residual claimant, public service motivation 
provides a rationale for the use of low powered incentive schemes. 
 




Many commentators have noted the relative premium on evidence compared to theory 
in this field. Consequently, this survey cannot have the feel of a meta-analysis, 
weighing the ‘bulk’ of the evidence in favour of this position or that – there is no 
‘bulk’. Rather, we will highlight a number of studies that provide some interesting 
evidence to illustrate a number of the points made above. The evidence is typically 
focussed on one of two questions: ‘what were the effects of the incentive scheme on 
outcomes?’, and ‘does the choice of contracts in specific settings fit with the theory?’. 
One of the key problems is finding settings where we can be confident that the effect 
of the scheme has been identified.  
 
(a) A robust private sector study 
Lazear (1998) uses a very rich and detailed dataset on a single firm that phases in a 
performance pay scheme over a period of time, and offers probably the most robust 
estimate yet of both the motivation and the sorting effects of variable pay. Lazear’s 
investigation uses data on a large car windscreen fitter ( Safelite) that changed 
compensation structure from straight salary to incentive pay (piece rates) over a 
period of 19 months. The same workers and the same firm are observed under both 
regimes and output is accurately measured. Because of the phasing-in period, 
productivity observations under both methods of pay are observed simultaneously. 
Exogenous productivity effects can thus be controlled for, and the identification 
strategy seems robust. The switch to piece rates was found to cause average output to 
rise by 44%. About half of this increase can be attributed to better workers joining the 
firm and half to motivation effects. Average wages also increased by about 10% 
following the switch. Thus for a given individual at a particular firm switching from 
time rates to piece rates caused his productivity to rise by 22%. 
                                                 
5 This section draws on Burgess and Metcalfe (1999b).   12
 
(b) A successful public sector scheme 
 
There is much less evidence relating to the public sector than the private sector. One 
powerful study is that of Kahn, Silva and Ziliak (2001) who examine the impact on 
the Brazilian tax collection authority of the introduction of performance pay. The 
1989 reform involved the payment of financial incentives based on individual and 
team performance in detecting and fining tax evaders. The amounts involved are very 
significant – bonusses were often worth more than twice mean annual salary. The 
authors use a panel of six years on ten tax regions, three years before the reform and 
three after. The findings show that the scheme had a dramatic effect: fine collections 
per inspection  were 75% higher than in the estimated counter-factual. The authors 
also noted considerable heterogeneity, with the impact varying from 19% to 145% 
across regions. This is not a difference-in-difference study because the reform was 
implemented everywhere, but the authors investigate whether tax compliance was 
responding to other macroeconomic or policy changes. The pattern of changes in fines 
suggests that it is indeed attributable to the performance pay reforms.  
 
(c) Dysfunctional behaviour, thresholds and timing 
There are now many examples of incentive pay schemes that are deemed to be 
failures, because the outcome for the organisation is not what it intended. Kerr’s 
(1975) article famously entitled “On the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B” 
contains many examples, as does Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994). Typical cases 
may include employees aiming to hit quantity targets regardless of quality or failing 
to co-operate with other employees. Perverse incentive effects generally arise when a 
job requires workers to perform several tasks but only some are measured and 
rewarded. Unsurprisingly, in such circumstances, the worker will concentrate his 
efforts on the rewarded tasks to the detriment of the overall organisational objectives.  
Such effects appear to be particularly related to schemes with thresholds and year-end 
effects. One clear example of this also arises from the JTPA programme. Courty and 
Marschke (1997, 1999, 2004) examine how the incentive structure of the JTPA 
programme affects the way in which the programme administrators report outcomes 
and the effect of their timing strategies on efficiency. The administrator can graduate 
a participant at any time between the end of training and 90 days thereafter and is 
awarded a bonus if an annual target is met for employment of programme graduates   13
by June 30 of each year. A simple incentive model predicts that throughout the year 
the reporting date relative to the end of training will take place as soon as the 
participant is employed or at the end of the 90 days. In June however, reporting 
behaviour is predicted to vary according to how well the agency has performed 
relative to its target. If the agency cannot possibly reach its target, or if it has already 
surpassed its target by the end of June, then it will graduate all participants who have 
completed their training. Otherwise, however, the minimum number will be graduated 
which enable the agency to achieve its quota. The evidence confirms that this model 
does indeed reflect how agencies act as the deadline approaches. Further, Courty and 
Marschke show that this timing strategy adversely affects the efficiency of training. It 
is found that earnings impacts in the last month of the year are lower than they are at 
other times of the year. It is hypothesised that this is a result of excess resources being 
diverted to accounting and away from human capital activities.  
Asch (1990) examines a similar situation in the public sector showing how US Navy 
recruiters reacted to an incentive scheme which rewarded them i f they achieved a 
quota of recruits before the cut-off date. Asch finds that the number of recruits was 
highest in the period immediately prior to the quota cut-off date and lowest 
immediately afterwards. Crucially, it was also shown that the average quality of 
recruits fell as the cut-off approached. The interpretation of this is that as the deadline 
approaches, the recruiters shade down their selection criteria in order to be able to hit 




There is a literature examining the i mpact of profit-sharing or employee share 
ownership schemes
6. Empirical work investigating the impact of team-based incentive 
schemes where the teams are defined within the organisation appears to be very 
scarce (but see the next section).  A recent interesting example of the former is that of 
Knez and Simester (2001) looking at a firm-level incentive scheme introduced by 
Continental Airlines in 1995. This promised bonusses to all hourly paid staff (some 
35,000).  One would expect free-riding to dominate any reaction to the scheme, since 
any one individual’s influence on the outcome is bound to be negligible. Holmström 
(1982) provides the formalisation for the free-riding problem being greater in large 
                                                 
6 See Blasi, Conti and Kruse (1996) for a survey.   14
firms. Econometric identification is achieved by comparing outsourced airports with 
non-outsourced airports, and the results show that performance did in fact increase by 
more in the latter. The authors argue that the results are robust to alternative 
hypotheses. This result is interpreted as the result of mutual (peer) monitoring. This is 
usually thought to be effective in small organisations such as partnerships (see 
below), not large firms. Knez and Simester argue that peer monitoring worked in 
Continental because employees worked in relatively small autonomous groups, within 
which monitoring and enforcement of group norms can be sustainable.  
The importance of mutual monitoring and group norms in teams has also been 
identified by Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003). The authors provide an 
empirical analysis of the relationship between team incentives, worker participation, 
worker heterogeneity and productivity. They use data at a garment factory (Koret) in 
California, which between 1995 and 1997 offered the opportunity to its workers to 
engage in team production. In particular, prior to 1995, sewing was divided into 
independent tasks and sewers were paid piece rates. Between 1995 and 1997 workers 
could choose to participate in autonomous work teams of typically six to seven 
workers, performing all tasks, and receiving a group piece rate. The analysis, based on 
weekly productivity data over the years 1995-1997 for 288 employees, shows that the 
introduction of teams was associated with a 14% increase in productivity, on average.  
Approximately one fifth of this effect was due to the fact that high ability workers at 
Koret were more likely to join teams. An interesting result is that teams formed early 
on attracted relatively high ability workers. These early teams also realised a larger 
team productivity effect. High ability workers were no more likely to leave the firm 
than low ability workers after joining a team. Moreover, some workers joined teams 
despite an absolute decrease in pay suggesting that teams offer non-pecuniary benefits 
to workers. These findings would suggest the presence of non-pecuniary benefits from 
teamwork, which might alleviate the free riding problem. 
Another result, which confirms the presence of mutual learning and group norms in 
teams is that teams with greater spread in ability are more productive. This, in fact, 
would suggest that superior skills get transmitted to the other members of the team 
and also that high ability workers are able to impose a higher team norm level of 
effort.  
Another part of this literature looks at (US) medical practices. Encinosa, Gaynor and 
Rebitzer (1997) construct a model of the extent of performance pay in compensation   15
contracts, allowing for group norms. This model is tested on medical group practices 
and it is found, as predicted, that the size of the group has a significant influence on 
the distribution of compensation. More recently, Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2001) 
look at incentives for doctors in HMO (health maintenance organisation) practices. 
They find significant effects of contracts that they characterise as providing $1 of 
income to the doctor for every $10 reduction in medical expenditure. They find an 
average of 5% reduction in medical expenditures following from the contract. 
Differences in HMO size are key to identifying the impact of incentives, these being 
assumed random. So the variation in team size is what is driving differences in the 
degree of sharpness of incentives.  
 
(e) Intrinsic motivation 
 
Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996) use the JTPA programme data and investigate the 
response of training centres to these incentives. Under the JTPA system, local training 
centres receive monetary rewards based on the employment levels and wage rates 
attained by graduates of the programme. This creates an incentive for the manager to 
‘cream-skim’ the most employable of the applicants into the programme. Heckman, 
Smith and Taber estimate the probability of acceptance into the programme using 
predicted earnings levels and earnings gains, calculated from observed human capital 
variables, as independent variables. In fact, they find that people with lower expected 
earnings levels are significantly more likely to be accepted into the programme. 
Weaker evidence suggests that those with larger expected gains are more likely to be 
accepted. These results contrast w ith the cream-skimming prediction, suggesting 
instead that for these bureaucrats at least, preferences for helping the disadvantaged 
overrode pecuniary incentives.  
(f)  Teachers 
 
Possibly the one area where there is a set of papers on the impact of incentive 
schemes in the public sector is that of performance pay for teachers. The use of 
performance pay for teachers has waxed and waned in the US with fears for national 
productivity – being introduced in great numbers after Sputnik, and later in the 1980s, 
only  to decline in use between these dates. There is a modest literature on this, 
surveyed in Burgess, Croxson, Gregg and Propper (2001). There is not, however, a   16
great deal of robust, credible evidence. A few papers are worth considering. First, 
Ladd (1999) considers an incentive programme for schools in Dallas, and uses panel 
data on schools to test for effects on test scores and student drop-out rates. The 
scheme, introduced in 1991/2, is school-based rather than individual teacher-based 
and provides monetary rewards to all teachers (indeed, all staff, including cleaners 
and secretaries) in successful schools. The details of the programme reflect quite a 
sophisticated approach to measuring the outcome, namely test score gains. The test 
score for each individual student is regressed on that student’s personal characteristics 
(race, gender, and eligibility for free school lunch) and the residuals calculated. These 
residuals were then compared to the residuals the previous year and estimates of gains 
produced, so controlling for linear pupil effects. The mean of these across all subjects 
and all enrolled pupils is the school’s score. The scheme used multiple measures of 
student outcomes from a variety of different tests in an attempt to minimise problems 
of “teaching to the test”; student attendance and drop-out were also factored in. Given 
the overall school score, around 20% of schools each year win bonuses, worth around 
$1000 to teachers. 
 Ladd’s study uses a panel of school-level student test score gains across six large 
Texas cities, over the period 1991-1995 (non-availability of comparable data prevents 
any “before/after” comparison). The output measure used is the pass rate on maths 
and reading tests, thus emphasising the bottom end of the ability distribution. The 
panel regressions control for common time effects and for city fixed effects rather 
than school fixed effects. There are also a number of school characteristics, such as 
racial mix and percent disadvantaged. The results are generally positive, in that pass 
rates appeared to increase faster in Dallas than in other cities. However, the results are 
somewhat complicated by the fact that a positive Dallas effect is also found for the 
year before the scheme was introduced. Effects differ by sub-groups, being most 
positive for Hispanics and whites, and insignificant for blacks. The study does not 
investigate how these improvements came about, but interestingly Ladd notes a 
substantial increase in turnover of school principals once the scheme was in place. 
Lavy (2002a) and (2002b) has produced two recent papers reporting on two different 
incentive experiments in schools in Israel. The first looks at a school tournament 
incentive scheme in which schools competed on their average performance and the 
bonusses were distributed equally to all teachers in the winning schools. This was 
shown to have a significant impact on pupil performance. The second paper evaluates   17
another (unrelated) experiment which is a teacher-level incentive scheme. This is 
again a tournament model, with the standardised teacher scores being compared and 
the winning teachers awarded a high-stakes money bonus. The criterion for success is 
based on regular high-stakes exams, and adopts a sophisticated approach to measuring 
exceptional achievement. A test score residual for each pupil is computed taking 
account of previous test scores (so focussing on test score gain) and socio-economic 
characteristics. This is then added up over all the pupils in the teacher’s class. 
Teachers in the top quarter of the distribution of this statistic are awarded the bonus, 
equal to around 25% of mean teacher salary. The paper deals with the identification 
issues (namely, which schools were included) in a credible fashion and finds a 
significant impact on performance f or teachers in the scheme.  Lavy also finds two 
other interesting facts. First, there appears to be no obvious negative spill-overs on to 
teaching other subjects – these exam performances do not suffer as they might if 
teacher energy were simply diverted from other subjects. Second, observable personal 
characteristics of the teachers do not predict the probability of being a ‘winning’  
teacher. 
 
(g) Choice of incentive schemes 
 
Theory makes several predictions concerning the choice of method of pay for an 
employee. Performance-related pay (PRP) is less likely when output is a noisier signal 
of effort, when the employee is more risk averse, when output is more costly to 
measure because of firm characteristics and when the output of a job is multi-
dimensional. Subjective evaluation of performance is more likely in cases of multi-
tasking. A number of authors have tested these predictions
7. 
Brown (1990) uses data on a large cross-section of US, predominantly manufacturing, 
establishments to empirically examine the determinants of firms’ choice of method of 
pay. Size is found to have a positive influence and occupational dispersion is found to 
be negatively correlated with the likelihood that an establishment operates a PRP 
scheme for any employees. Drago and Heywood ( 1995) perform a similar 
investigation using Australian establishment data and find again that size has a 
significant positive influence on PRP likelihood. They also verify the prediction that 
                                                 
7 See also Chiappori and Salanie (2003) for a review of empirical testing of contract theory in general.   18
the number of supervisors as a proportion of the workforce is negatively correlated 
with PRP likelihood. 
In addition to these broad cross-sections, two case studies are of interest. Fernie and 
Metcalf (1998) investigate the pay systems and characteristics of four individual 
workplaces. Those investigated are a bookmaker, an (ex-civil service) executive 
agency, a contracted-out (from local authority) unit collecting parking fines and the 
advertising section of a daily newspaper. These four are chosen because they are all 
call centres, with the exception of the bookmaker which is used as a comparator. They 
find that the pattern of the choice of method of pay fits with some of the theoretical 
imperatives above. In particular, the balance of incentives and monitoring is 
interesting. Paarsch and Shearer (1997) investigate the determinants and productivity 
effects of different methods of pay in the tree-planting industry of British Columbia 
over a 6 month planting season. A model of contractual choice is constructed specific 
to this context, and a structural model estimated. This shows that the firm appears to 
select contract form optimally – that is, to make both the choice of piece or time rate, 
and the value of the piece rate dependent on planting conditions.  
The evidence from these case studies and from the cross-section studies lends support 
to the idea that measurement costs significantly influence the likelihood of 
performance pay in an establishment.  
Turning more specifically to the public sector, Burgess and Metcalfe (1999a) use 
cross-section establishment data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey to investigate the pattern of existence of incentive schemes across private 
manufacturing, private services and public services. They confirm that public service 
establishments are much less likely to operate any incentive schemes than private 
firms, and then investigate whether this is optimally the case or whether the public 
sector is simply inefficiently incentivised. Controlling for variation in size, union 
density, and workforce composition variables, which  identify general measurement 
issues, the study compares the presence of performance pay across both sectors by 8 
occupation groups. Disaggregating the presence of schemes by occupation identifies 
the importance of multi-tasking and allows an insight into c ore public / private 
differences.  The hypothesis is that within each occupation, employees in public and 
private service jobs perform broadly the same tasks in terms of complexity and   19
measurability. Thus if multi-tasking issues are the core determinants of the optimal 
type of incentive structure and the public sector is efficiently run, then we should 
expect to see no difference in the pattern of existence of incentive schemes between 
public and private services. If the issue of multiple principals is important, then we 
should expect these problems to only arise for decision makers. An unskilled manual 
worker such as a cleaner faces no accountability difference if she works in a 
university or in a private software company; the issue of working for multiple 
principals will, if at all, affect managers and professionals only. If this is the case, 
then we should expect to see no difference in the existence of performance pay for 
manual workers but fewer establishments operating such a scheme for managers and 
professionals. If the public sector is simply inefficiently incentivised, then we should 
expect to see fewer incentive schemes for all occupations. The key finding is that 
there is no difference in the likelihood of an establishment operating a performance 
pay scheme for manuals but public service establishments are much less likely to 
operate a PRP scheme for non-manual workers. 
The choice of scheme is also considered. It is found that merit pay (based on 
subjective assessments), as predicted, is more likely  than objective performance pay 
for non-manuals (whose output is harder to measure) and the reverse is true for 
manual workers. Looking at differences across the public/private services divide, we 
see a big difference between sectors in the likelihood of performance pay for non-
manual workers. This may be because of a different occupational composition within 
the professional / technical group. Salespeople, for example, are a classic case where 
performance pay works well and these come into the same occupational category as 
nurses and teachers. If this is the case, then merit pay ought to optimally be used more 
prevalently for non-manuals in the public sector. In fact, however, it is found that 
merit pay is also significantly less likely in the public sector for all occupations. The 
study concludes that the lack of incentive schemes, particularly subjective 
performance evaluation may be evidence in favour of inefficiency in the public sector.  
 
5. New Policies, New Research 
 
   20
Despite this lack of a firm evidence base, there has been much activity in recent years 
introducing more serious performance pay schemes into the public sector in Britain. 
In this section, we briefly review these schemes. We also note a number of in-
progress studies evaluating these reforms a nd attempting to fill in some of the 
evidence gaps. This specificity of approach meshes well with Dixit’s (2002) views: 
“Empirical research on past reforms should not look for blanket verdicts on their 
success or failure, but should relate the probability  of success to specific 
characteristics of the agencies or organisations, and theoretical research on the design 
of new reforms should likewise pay attention to these specifics.”  
 
(a) Performance Pay for Teachers 
 
For the first time in recent history, the current UK government has introduced a 
national scheme for individual based performance related pay for teachers. Teachers’ 
pay has been on a single scale, with nine basic increments. Under the new scheme, 
teachers who have reached the ninth increment are eligible to apply to pass a 
Performance Threshold. Their personal performance is assessed against various 
specific categories, including professional development and pupil attainment. If 
successful, they receive an annual bonus of £2000, which they will continue to 
receive until the end of their career, without needing to reapply. They also move on to 
a new, upper pay scale where they will be eligible for further performance-related 
increments. The first round of this scheme began in 2000. This constitutes an 
individual performance related pay scheme for teachers.  
 A number of UK commentators are highly critical of the notion of performance pay 
in education in general, and the current performance threshold scheme in particular. 
Teaching unions have also shown outright hostility to these proposals. Objections to 
the individual performance pay revolve round three overlapping concerns, relating to 
some of the public sector characteristics noted above. First, teaching is 
multidimensional and aimed at much wider outcomes than exam results or test scores. 
Second, teaching involves team-based co-operation that is inconsistent with an 
individual PRP scheme. Third, teachers are professionals and do not require financial 
incentives to induce effort.  
Research is underway to evaluate the impact of the Performance Threshold on pupil 
attainment (see Burgess and Croxson, 2001).   21
 
(b) Performance Pay in the Major Government Agencies – the Makinson Report 
 
John Makinson, then Group Finance Director of the media company Pearson PLC, 
was recruited by the Public Sector Productivity Panel to investigate the idea of 
incentivising civil servants. Specifically, he looked at 150,000 front-line staff in the 
major government agencies working with the public: the Benefits Agency, HM 
Customs & Excise, the Employment Service (now Jobcentre Plus) and the Inland 
Revenue. His report in 2000 contained specific proposals tailored to those four 
agencies. These have been used to design some pilot schemes for Jobcentre Plus, the 
Child Support Agency and HM Customs & Excise.  
The key features of these schemes are as follows. First, they are neither individual nor 
organisation-wide schemes, but team-based. Some of these teams are at office level 
and may comprise up to 100 people or so; some of the teams consist of entire 
divisions or regions and include many thousands of people. Second, the schemes have 
threshold targets for bonuses – they are not linear incentive schemes. The ‘stretch’ 
factor to win the bonus is typically a given percentage increase on the minimum 
standard target, and related to the Public Service Agreement targets. The bonuses are 
a percentage of salary, and give an opportunity to earn up to 5% more. Third, they 
have a range of targets, usually 5, which mix quantity and quality targets.   
We
8 are engaged in an evaluation of these schemes.  
 
(c) Performance Pay in the NHS 
 
The NHS Plan (2000) devotes a chapter to the design of incentives for better 
performance. The incentive scheme is designed as a system of rewards based on 
performance and consisting of (a) greater autonomy, in the form of lighter monitoring 
by Regional Offices, less frequent monitoring by the Commission for Health 
Improvement and greater freedom to decide the local organisation of services,  (b) 
national recognition and (c) financial incentives. Considerable emphasis is given to 
financial incentives, in particular to extra rewards for team-production.  As the 
document states “…Incentives will also be developed for joint working between 
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primary care groups, NHS Trusts and Social Services to achieve improvements in 
rehabilitation facilities for older people…. The Performance Fund will enable NHS 
trusts and primary care trusts to offer greater incentives to staff in clinical teams and 
primary health care teams linked to their contribution to service objectives.” 
Therefore a distinction is made between joint production across NHS organisations 
and joint production within the same NHS organisation, although a clear definition of 
a team is missing. The design of team rewards is postponed pending the results of 
some pilot schemes on team bonuses in a number of NHS trusts that are currently 
being evaluated. 
 
(d) Issues of Scheme Design 
 
The incentive schemes designed for JobcentrePlus, Child Support Agency, HM 
Customs and Excise and the NHS all highlight the importance of teamwork and 
include team-based compensations. In the public agencies where the new policies are 
being introduced, in fact, output is hardly observable at an individual level, so that the 
use of individual-based incentives would n ot be feasible. Moreover in these 
organisations there are complementarities in production and workers do contribute to 
the same outcome. However, the very broad definition of a team is a potential 
weakness in the design of these incentive schemes.  
A clear definition of a team is very important for setting an optimal incentive scheme. 
As we have considered above, teams can be identified by the production process or 
can be created by the compensation system, in order to promote some positive 
externalities of teamwork. When there is a natural production function defining a 
team, the team members and their output are automatically identified, and the choice 
of the compensation scheme depends on the degree of measurability of output. When, 
instead, the team is n ot defined by the production function, the selection of team 
members, and hence the identification of joint output, depends on the reason for 
promoting teamwork. The incentive mechanism and hence the reward system, has to 
be designed differently, according to the motivation it acts on. Therefore, identifying 
the rationale behind the existence of a team is crucial for designing an effective 
incentive scheme. If for example the aim is to promote peer monitoring, the team 
members will be chosen so that they are able to observe each other and the reward 
system will be contingent on their joint performance.    23
If teams are defined very broadly it is difficult to identify the reason for their 
existence and hence difficult to design an effective incentive scheme. Moreover in 
large teams the contribution of each team member to the joint output may be very 
little and the team members may find it very hard to identify their team. This can 
encourage free-riding.  
The similarities in these scheme designs presumably arise because they have been 
designed centrally, by the government, with little knowledge of the actual production 
process or the organisational structure of each single agency. Yet a clear message we 
get from the theory is that incentives should be tailored specifically to each agency in 
the public sector. In particular, as argued by Dixit (2002), performance-based 
incentives do have important roles in public sector agencies but they “… need 




In the light of the increasing attention devoted to performance measures by the current 
government, we have considered the issues involved in designing performance-related 
incentives in the public sector, and the evidence on their structure and effects. 
In particular we have investigated how optimal incentives for public sector workers 
may differ from those in the private sector, and if so, what types of incentives are 
more appropriate for the public sector. A clear message we get from the theory is that 
the u se of performance related incentives, and in particular of performance related 
pay, is more problematic in the public sector than in the private sector. This is due to 
aspects like multi-tasking, multiple principals, the difficulty of defining and 
measuring output, and the issue of the intrinsic motivation of workers. In these 
circumstances the theory predicts that low powered incentive schemes are optimal and 
task assignment and work organisation become crucial in promoting better 
performance and may sometimes be substitutes for high powered financial incentives. 
But “the” optimal incentive scheme for public sector agencies depends ultimately on 
the type of the organisation and on which of the above aspects are more important. 
For example, if multi-tasking is a major issue, task assignment could be an alternative 
incentive device. By grouping together complementary tasks and assigning them to 
the same agent, the principal could limit the opportunities of dysfunctional behaviour .   24
Moreover, if measurability i ssues are particularly relevant in a multitasking 
environment, the principal, where possible, should engage in monitoring the agents 
and use more subjective compensation schemes like merit pay. 
Team-based rewards may also be preferred to individual compensation schemes, in 
contexts where co-operation is important for the outcome of the organisation or where 
only aggregate measures of performance are available. Investing the bonuses gained 
from better performance in creating a better working environment (e.g. new 
equipment and facilities for workers) could also be an optimal alternative to 
individual bonuses in organisations where workers have a strong intrinsic motivation. 
 
The evidence on the effects of incentive schemes on outcomes and on how the choice 
of contracts in specific settings fits with the theory suggests that incentives do act on 
individuals’ behaviour. In particular, people do respond to a change in their 
compensation system, but they may not respond in the way intended by the scheme's 
designer. There is evidence that workers do concentrate their effort on the rewarded 
tasks, and engage in dysfunctional behaviour. This is particularly important for 
schemes with thresholds.  
In comparing the choice of contracts between the private and public sector, there are 
big differences on the way workers are rewarded, above all in the case of non-manual 
workers: a public organisation is less likely to operate a performance related pay 
scheme than a private organisation. This is in line with the predictions of the theory: 
manual workers in the private and public sector perform the same tasks and face the 
same complexity. The output they produce is subject to the same measurability issues. 
Hence we should expect the same behavioural response to incentives for t hese 
workers, and expect to see the same incentive schemes between public and private 
services. The theory would suggest a widespread use of merit pay to overcome the 
problems of objective performance-related pay, but this is not borne out by the 
evidence. Hence there is some (weak) evidence for thinking that incentive pay is not 
set optimally in the public sector.  
The theoretical arguments make it clear that we cannot simply read across from the 
private sector, and that optimal incentive schemes in the public sector will be 
different. Currently, there is not a large body of evidence to assess the theoretical 
arguments. The evaluation of the current pilot schemes in the UK public sector will  
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